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Abstract
Recently, two stylized facts about the behavior of the U.S. economy have emerged: ﬁrst, macroeco-
nomic aggregates appear to be less volatile post-1984 than in the preceding two decades; second,
monetary policy appears more responsive to inﬂationary pressures — and thereby more “stabilizing”
— during the Volcker/Greenspan chairmanships relative to earlier regimes. Does a causal relation-
ship exist between these two observations? In particular, has “better” policy by the Federal Reserve
BoardcontributedsigniﬁcantlytothelessenedvolatilityoftheU.S.economy? Thispaperusesastruc-
tural vector autoregressive (VAR) speciﬁcation to address these questions, examining the advantages
and limitations of such an approach. In contrast with much of the existing research on these topics,
I ﬁnd that most of the quantitatively signiﬁcant changes in volatility are attributed to breaks in the
non-policy portion of the structural VAR, and not to the identiﬁed policy equation.
Address: Department of Economics, 238 Church Street, Middletown, CT 06459–0007.
Phone: (860) 685-4634. FAX: (860) 685-2301.
JEL Categories: E52, E58, E31, C32.
Keywords: Monetary policy reaction function, structural VAR models, Taylor rule, Volcker disinﬂation,
parameter instability.
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at the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago for helpful comments. Any remaining errors are the author’s responsibility.1 Introduction
Has the prolonged U.S. economic expansion of the past few decades been due to good fortune or good
policy? In the popular and business press, the Federal Reserve Board — and Chairman Alan Greenspan
in particular — often receives accolades for the sustained growth and moderate to low inﬂation experi-
enced since the mid–1980s. Recent academic work also has focused upon the Fed, crediting monetary
policymakersforashareoftherecenteconomicoutcomeswhileblamingthemforthepoorperformance
experienced in the late 1960s and 1970s. This literature raises a pair of questions. First, is the greater
stability experienced by the U.S. economy recently — as documented by McConnell and Perez-Quiros
(2000), Blanchard and Simon (2001), and Stock and Watson (2002), for example — due primarily to an
“improvement” in monetary policy, or have policy makers beneﬁted from some transformation in the
economy itself? Put more glibly, has Alan Greenspan been smart or lucky — or both?
Once attention is focused upon monetary policy, a second question naturally arises: what attributes
of policy have changed? In assessing the role of monetary policy, it is important (indeed, from the stand-
point of econometric identiﬁcation, necessary) to distinguish between exogenous (unforecastable) inno-
vations to policy and the endogenous response of policy to the state of the economy. This dichotomy
determines whether changes in the policy instrument can be prescribed to factors other than actions by
the monetary authority. Interestingly, the two main empirical literatures on monetary policy place very
different emphasis on each of these components.
Beginning with Taylor (1993), a large literature has investigated simple speciﬁcations of a feedback
rule for monetary policy. Usually no attempt is made to interpret or explain the residuals of the esti-
mated rule. Recent work in this “Taylor rules” literature (e.g. Judd and Rudebusch, 1998; Taylor, 1999;
Clarida et al., 2000) provides a single direct answer to the pair of questions posed at the opening of this
paper: by failing to respond forcefully enough to inﬂationary pressures, “inappropriate” Federal Reserve
policy introduced instability into the economy prior to 1980. In contrast, a conventional view of U.S.
economic performance during these years posits an unavoidable policy dilemma in the face of adverse
supply shocks (and possibly domestic political pressure).1 While the choice between high inﬂation or
high unemployment may have been difﬁcult and undesirable, this more traditional view does not regard
the Fed’s policy response as negligent.
1DeLong (1997) provides an informative discussion of the policy environment in the late 1960s and 1970s.
1It is important to recognize that much of the Taylor rules literature presumes monetary policy to be
the culprit: single equation models cannot address the question of changing dynamics in the broader
economy, while small, stylized macroeconomic models that fail to account for instability elsewhere
could lead to improper inference about the role of the policy rule — especially if the true nature of the
policy rule is sensitive to the equations that govern the broader economy.
Thestructuralvectorautoregressive(SVAR)literaturerepresentsthesecondmainempiricalapproach.
Until fairly recently, this literature had focused almost exclusively upon the effects of exogenous mon-
etary policy shocks, largely ignoring the estimated monetary policy rule or reaction function. Yet the
shocks account for a very small fraction of the total variation of the policy instruments; most is due to
the endogenous component of policy. This lack of attention to the estimated reaction function has been
a subject of criticism (e.g. Cochrane, 1994; Rudebusch, 1998; McCallum, 1999).
In a widely-cited paper, Bernanke and Mihov (1998) address this issue with a “semi-structural” VAR
model and ﬁnd evidence of regime changes in U.S. monetary policy in both 1979 and 1982, but report
limited evidence of structural instability in the VAR coefﬁcients. In their Handbook of Macroeconomics
chapter, Christiano et al. (1999) summarize much of the structural VAR literature at the time, and re-
port no evidence of structural instability across their estimates. Cogley and Sargent (2001) use Bayesian
techniques in a three-variable reduced-form VAR and report to ﬁnd evidence of changes in an implied
monetary policy rule like that of Clarida et al. (2000); Cogley and Sargent (2005) repeat this exercise in a
speciﬁcation that allows for breaks in both the variances and the coefﬁcients of the VAR, and re-afﬁrm
mostoftheirearlierresults. Sims(2001)criticizestheresultsbasedontheimpliedpolicyrulesfromthese
two studies along similar lines as the above criticisms of the Taylor rules approach. Sims and Zha (2004)
use a Bayesian regime switching model of a fully-identiﬁed, non-recursive SVAR. They report some evi-
dence of regime switching in U.S. monetary policy, but their preferred speciﬁcation ﬁnds instability only
in the variances of the structural shocks and not in the estimated coefﬁcients. Overall, there does not yet
appeartobeaconsensusintheVARliteratureonthesourcesorsigniﬁcanceofinstabilityduetochanges
in the practice of monetary policy.
In trying to disentangle the questions posed above, it is essential to take into account the feedback
between policy and the other variables of the model — particularly in a dynamic setting. Therefore, I
investigate a semi-structural VAR model, in which the identifying restrictions yield an estimate of the
policy rule, as outlined in section 2. My approach is similar in spirit to that of Sims and Zha (2004),
2but I work with existing structural VAR models estimated in a classical statistical paradigm. Section 3
examines the empirical ﬁndings, starting with the properties of the estimated reaction function across
various sub-sample periods, then explores the possibility of signiﬁcant instability residing in the non-
policy part of the model. Sections 3.1 and 3.2 pursue methods to quantify the economic signiﬁcance of
some of the instability uncovered in section 2.3. To foreshadow the main result, despite some evidence
of instability in the practice of monetary policy, these changes do not appear to be able to account for
most of the varying economic outcomes observed in the data. Section 3.3 explores some interpretations
of the results, and section 4 concludes.
2 Monetary VAR Speciﬁcation and Estimation
2.1 Speciﬁcation and Identifying Restrictions
A variety of identifying assumptions can be found in the vector autoregressive (VAR) literature that at-
tempts to quantify the effects of monetary policy. In this paper, a semi-structural block-recursive frame-
work is employed. This approach is common in the literature: see Leeper et al. (1996), Bernanke and
Mihov (1998) or Christiano et al. (1999) for some prominent examples.2 The data (described below) are
separated into two groups or blocks: those that measure macroeconomic activity (such as output and
the aggregate price level), and those that involve monetary policy. The latter group can be further di-
vided into the policy instrument of the Federal Reserve (in this study, the federal funds rate) and other
variables in the market for bank reserves.
Formally,let Xt bethen×1vectorofendogenousvariablesinthemodel,partitionedas Xt =[Yt Mt]0.
Yt is a vector of “activity” variables, comprised of monthly measures of output (log of the industrial pro-
duction index), the price level (log of the consumer price index3) and an index of commodity prices
(also in logs). Mt is a vector of policy variables: the Federal funds rate, nonborrowed reserves and total
2Other authors characterize this class of models as “partially identiﬁed;” as noted below, only a subset of the shocks are
imbued with a structural economic interpretation. Keating (1996) provides a detailed investigation of block-recursive identiﬁ-
cation techniques in VARs.
3Due to mismeasurements of the CPI prior to 1983 resulting from the method used to impute the cost of owner-occupied
housing, the CPI excluding shelter is used.
3reserves (both in logs).4 A VAR model then can be written as:






Since the structural disturbances are mutually and serially uncorrelated by assumption, the covariance
matrix Ω will be diagonal.
Pre-multiplying equation (1) by Φ−1
0 yields an expression for the reduced-form model,
A(L)Xt = vt , (2)
where A(L) = I − A1L − A2L2 −···− ApLp is a lag polynomial of order p, and Ak is the n ×n matrix of
coefﬁcients such that Ak =Φ−1
0 Φk for k =1, ..., p, and I is the n×n identity matrix.5
Given the division of the data into the Yt and Mt vectors, the reduced-form model of equation (2)













































This restriction is justiﬁed by assuming sluggish adjustment of the variables in the macroeconomic ac-
tivity block to innovations in the policy sector: examples include lags in the ability to gather and process
information about the monetary sector, or sluggish adjustment of price setters or production decisions.
Speciﬁcally, the activity block is assumed to react to changes in εM,t with a one period lag. Conversely,
the (Φ−1
0 )MY block is left unrestricted, thus allowing each of the policy variables to react to contempora-
neous movements in all of the activity variables.
4While unit root tests on most of the series in this speciﬁcation tend not to reject a null of non-stationarity, I follow previous
authors and estimate the VAR with log levels. Bernanke and Mihov (1998) report few differences between estimation in log
differences and in log levels. Sims et al. (1990) report that estimation in (log) levels of a VAR model with an unknown number
of unit roots is consistent for sufﬁcient lag length.
5The leading identity matrix reﬂects the normalization of placing the variable xit on the left-hand side of the ith equa-
tion of the reduced-form system, which then can be estimated consistently by OLS. This notation ignores intercept terms for
convenience; they are included in estimation.
4To identify the monetary policy reaction function and structural monetary policy shock, additional
restrictions must be placed on (Φ−1
0 )MM. Over most of the sample the federal funds rate serves as the pol-
icy instrument, and the Fed accommodated changes in reserves demand. Consistent with Christiano et
al. (1996a,b) and Bernanke and Mihov (1998) the funds rate thus is ordered ﬁrst in the Mt block. A recur-
sive structure for the (Φ−1
0 )MM block implies that the funds rate does not respond to contemporaneous
innovations to the reserves market variables. It does respond to lagged movements in these variables,
which reﬂect a combination of supply and demand shocks within the market for reserves. Under these
identifying assumptions, the residuals of the funds rate equation capture the structural monetary policy
shocks: the unforecastable component of changes in the policy instrument. The funds rate equation
in the structural model is associated with the monetary policy reaction function: the component of the
policy instrument that responds endogenously to the state of the economy.
The above restrictions are sufﬁcient for the identiﬁcation of the exogenous component of monetary
policy. The dynamic effects of these monetary policy shocks can be found by inverting Φ(L) in equa-
tion (1) to construct the structural vector moving-average representation:
Xt =Θ(L)εt , (3)
where Θ(L) = Θ0+Θ1L+Θ2L2+··· = Φ(L)−1 is a (possibly inﬁnite-order) lag polynomial. The estimated
coefﬁcients in Θ(L) determine the impulse response functions to the structural shocks, εt; the responses
to the estimated monetary policy shock are analyzed in section 3.
2.2 Estimation
The model is estimated with data from January 1966 through August 2001.6 Strongin (1995) and Meu-
lendyke (1998) note that the modern form of the reserves market came into existence in the mid-1960s.
As emphasized by Strongin (1995) and Bernanke and Mihov (1998), the Fed shifted to a non-borrowed
reserves targeting regime during the Volcker disinﬂation.7 As a result, there are a priori reasons to isolate
this period from the rest of the sample: once the policy instrument shifted from the funds rate to non-
borrowed reserves, the residual of the fed funds equation no longer would represent exogenous policy
6The Akaike Information Criteria suggests a lag length of 8 months. The impulse responses shown below are fairly similar
with a one-year lag length (which is fairly common in the VAR literature) and with 14 lags (as in Bernanke and Mihov, 1998).
7See Meulendyke (1998) and Walsh (2003) for further discussion of the change in operating procedures after October 1979.
5shocks.8 Failure to account for such a change in the operation of monetary policy would result in a
misspeciﬁed model, incorrect impulse response functions, and thereby false inference about the role of
policy.9 SimsandZha(2004)alsoﬁndevidenceofadistinctpolicyregimeduringtheVolckerdisinﬂation.
Monthly data are used as the plausibility of the above timing restrictions for identiﬁcation depends
critically on the length of a “period;” much of the VAR literature uses quarterly data, which implies a
full three months between the time a monetary policy action is undertaken and the time agents are
allowed to respond. Moreover, these timing restrictions are often motivated as approximations of state-
contingent behavior, and such approximations are less appropriate as the time that agents are not per-
mitted to respond lengthens.10
2.3 Stability of Reduced-Form Estimates
Table 1 examines the Akaike and Schwarz Information Criteria for VAR models estimated across several
combinations of sample period and lag length. The information criteria are log likelihood statistics,
with penalties for additional parameters. (The SIC penalizes additional parameters more heavily than
the AIC.) Heuristically, the lower the AIC or SIC measure, the better the “ﬁt” of the equation. These
information criteria are computed for the reduced-form models in equation (2).
Sims (1998a,b) has argued in favor of using these measures to examine the overall stability of a VAR
model. By this metric, a model estimated over a full sample is preferred to one estimated separately over
two sub-sample periods if the former has a lower value of the AIC or SIC than a weighted-average of the
information criteria for the latter case. The weights are determined by the proportion of the full sample
in each sub-sample estimation.11
Table 1 permits an analysis of structural instability for two variants of the reduced-form model. The
ﬁrst is estimated over the full 1966:01 – 2001:08 sample, and breakpoints after October 1979 and Decem-
ber 1982 — the onset and conclusion of the Volcker disinﬂation experiment, respectively — are consid-
ered. The second investigates a joint sample with the intervening 1970:10 – 1982:12 period excluded. As
cited above, some authors have suggested that, outside of the “Volcker disinﬂation,” there has not been
8Notice that it is not sufﬁcient to simply impose a break at October 1979 in light of the shift in operating procedures.
9Because the identifying assumptions employed by the above-cited Bayesian literature do not depend upon the particular
policy instrument in the reserves market, they do not face the same issues when confronting the Volcker disinﬂation period.
10If the true delay in response of any of the Yt variables to innovations to εM,t is three months (or more), the monthly VAR
will recover that behavior in the estimated coefﬁcients of the appropriate impulse response functions.
11This result can be shown by comparing the log likelihood functions for the two cases. I thank Phil Howrey for helping to
clarify this point.
6any statistically discernible change in the monetary policy regime.
The ﬁrst row of table 1, labeled “Fixed Coefﬁcients,” lists the AIC and SIC values for the reduced-
form model estimated over the 1966:01 –2001:08 period. The second row lists the same statistics for a
model that allows for a break in all coefﬁcient values (and the variances) after October 1979. Notice that
at all reported lag lengths, the model that allows for a break is preferred (i.e. has a lower value for the
information criteria) to the model with ﬁxed coefﬁcients. The third row allows for a break after 1982:12,
with similar (if slightly less strong) results.12
For each lag length considered the joint sample period, which excludes the Volcker disinﬂation pe-
riod, always has a noticeably lower value of the reported statistics than does the full sample. Thus, the
statistical evidence on model ﬁt supports the exclusion of the 1979:10 – 1982:12 period as well. Inter-
estingly, the AIC always favors treating the joint sample period as two distinct samples, whereas the SIC
suggests the best ﬁtting model does not feature a break. These results merit further investigation of the
nature of changes in the stability of the VAR even after accounting for the (temporary) disruption caused
by the Volcker experiment.13
Table 2 shifts to examining the stability of the individual equations. Panel (a) reports the p-values for
Wald tests of parameter stability of each equation of the reduced-form VAR model. The null hypothesis
of cross-sample stability can be strongly rejected for the CPI, the funds rate, and total reserves with 8
lags in the VAR. At longer lag lengths the null for each of the variables is rejected at conventional levels of
signiﬁcance. A Wald test is used instead of a Chow test as the former is robust to changes in the variance
across the sub-samples; panel (b) reports p-values for the Goldfeld-Quandt test of homoskedasticity,
which indicate rejection of a constant variance for four of the six variables in the VAR (at all lag lengths).
Interestingly, the CPI is one of the variables for which the variance appears constant across sub-samples.
All of the variables in the model exhibit instability in either their estimated coefﬁcients or their vari-
ance. The rejection of stability for the fund funds equation coefﬁcients is not surprising in light of the
results reported in the Taylor rules literature. However, both the VAR equation in this section and a Tay-
lor rule are reduced-form relationships. Stability tests on reduced-form equations cannot determine the
12Note that the results in table 1 are not directly comparable across different lag lengths: the initial values of the VAR are
drawn from within the stated sample period, thereby making the number of observations used for estimation vary inversely
with the number of lags.
13These results imply that including the full sample would increase the likelihood of rejecting the null hypothesis of stable
coefﬁcients, as the model ﬁt is worse in this case. All of the subsequent analysis is conducted with a VAR system that excludes
the Volcker disinﬂation time period.
7economic sources of instability. In particular, so long as the Fed’s understanding of the nature of the
macroeconomy informs the policy decisions of the FOMC (as would be the case for both optimal policy
and certain classes of robust policy rules), the coefﬁcients in a Taylor rule are not themselves preference
parameters, but functions of both the Fed’s preferences — the relative weights on the arguments of its
objective function — and the constraints imposed by the structural equations that describe the dynam-
ics of the macroeconomy. Any changes in the equations that determine the non-policy variables of the
model — which are also quite consistent with the results in table 2 — also should lead to instability in
the coefﬁcients of a Taylor rule, even if the preferences embedded in the Fed’s objective function remain
unchanged.
3 Sources of Regime Variation
While a change in operating procedures necessitates segmenting the sample, it does not immediately
imply that the practice of monetary policy — or the dynamic behavior of the economy more generally —
differs between the periods before and after the Volcker disinﬂation. In this section I explore the magni-
tude and importance of any changes over time in the identiﬁed structural blocks of the model.
Figure 1 compares the impulse response functions to a 25 basis point contractionary monetary pol-
icy shock for four of the main variables in the VAR model of section 2.14 The VAR is estimated over
three sample periods: the ﬁrst column reports the impulse responses in the full sample from 1966:01
to 2001:08 (excluding, as above, the Volcker disinﬂation period); the second column represents a “pre-
Volcker” sample (1966:01 – 1979:08) and the third is a “post-Volcker” sample (1983:01 – 2001:08). In each
panel, the solid line represents the point estimates of the impulse response function, while the dark and
light grey shaded regions represent the 68% and 95% bootstrapped conﬁdence intervals, respectively.15
Several features are common to all three estimation periods. First, the initial response of output
to a contractionary policy shock is positive, albeit not statistically signiﬁcant and short-lived, followed
by a protracted negative response. A studied in detail in Hanson (2004), with monthly data each pe-
riod exhibits a “price puzzle:” the CPI price level increases in response to a monetary policy shock for a
protracted period of time. These positive responses are generally not statistically signiﬁcant, and are
14While the size of a “typical” monetary policy shock varies across the sample periods, the magnitude of the shock is normal-
ized in ﬁgure 1 to facilitate comparison.
15See Kilian (1998, 1999) for a description of the bias-corrected bootstrap procedure used herein.
8mitigated by the inclusion of commodity prices in the VAR.16 The fed funds rate illustrates a persis-
tent response to the initial 25 basis-point contractionary policy innovation, even rising further for a few
months following the shock. The higher interest rates are generally associated with a small decline in
non-borrowed reserves, consistent with a liquidity effect.17
Splitting the sample reduces the statistical signiﬁcance of the output response. In the earlier sample
(1966 – 1979) output is below its pre-shock value for about two years, and the point estimate returns to
slightly(thoughnotstatisticallysigniﬁcantly)abovetheinitialvalueabout3yearsfollowingthestructural
policy innovation. On the other hand, the impulse responses in the latter sample period (1983 – 2001)
generallydonotillustrateastatisticallydiscernibleeffectofthestructuralinnovationstopolicywhenthe
95% conﬁdence interval is the criteria for signiﬁcance. The 68% conﬁdence interval, on the other hand,
suggests a protracted negative response to contractionary monetary policy, lasting about three years.
Moreover, the overall decline exhibited by the point estimate is greater than in the pre-Volcker sample
period. Becausetheaverageamplitudeandvarianceoftheestimatedpolicyshocksarelowerinthepost-
Volcker sample period than in the pre-Volcker one, the conﬁdence intervals in the latter sample period
arecorrespondinglylarger. Withoutmorecarefulanalysisofthenatureofthesepolicyshocks,however,it
is difﬁcult to say why the variance changes over time. On the one hand, the change might reﬂect “better”
exogenouspolicy,inthattheFedisintroducinglessexogenousinstabilityintotheeconomy. Ontheother
hand,thechangesinthedistributionoftheexogenouspolicyshocksmayreﬂectachangeinthestructure
of the broader economy that reduced control error by the Fed, thereby allowing for smaller on average
exogenouspolicyshockstoachievethesameobjectivesthatwouldhaverequiredlargerexogenousshifts
in the funds rate prior to 1979.18 The mapping of the decline in the monetary policy shock variance into
“good luck” or “good policy” is not so clear cut.
The estimated price responses are also interesting. In general, there is very limited evidence of any
statistically discernible response of the price level to contractionary policy shocks. This ﬁnding is fairly
16Sims (1992) ﬁrst proposed including commodity prices as an inﬂation indicator in monetary VARs to avoid the “price puz-
zle.” Hanson (2004) demonstrates that commodity prices are not sufﬁcient to eliminate the price puzzle, particularly in the
pre-Volcker period, and that the puzzle is generally more pronounced with monthly than quarterly data. Interestingly, the
above evidence of a post-Volcker price puzzle is slightly larger — at least in terms of the point estimate — than that reported by
Hanson (2004), whose sample ends in 1998.
17These results, as well as all those reported below, are qualitatively similar if output is measured by the unemployment
rate, and/or if prices are measured with the personal consumption expenditure deﬂator. Further, estimates based on the gap
between the actual and detrended (via a quadratic-trend) unemployment rate, and the inﬂation rate (of either price series),
return similar results as well. In the interest of brevity these results are not reported here; contact the author for details.
18Moreno (2004) reports evidence of a change in the behavior of price setters between the sub-samples analyzed here.
9common for monthly VARs in which the policy instrument is the fed funds rate; recall that the timing as-
sumptions used to identify the structural policy shocks are more plausible with higher-frequency data.
The point estimate of the response in the pre-Volcker period is similar to that of the jointly estimated
sample, with a positive response for nearly one and one-half years. In contrast, the point estimate is
always positive for the post-Volcker period. Recall that these estimates include commodity prices, os-
tensibly to avoid the “price puzzle.” One interpretation of these results is that they provide evidence for a
“cost channel” of monetary policy, as in Barth and Ramey (2001) and Christiano et al. (2005) — and that
the nature of the cost channel may have changed over time.
Finally, the funds rate takes on a noticeably different dynamic pattern in the sub-sample estimates
relative to the joint sample. In particular, the earlier sample period provides some evidence of a rever-
sal in monetary policy between 18 and 36 months following a contractionary policy shock. This rever-
sal, while at best only minimally signiﬁcant in a statistical sense, is consistent with an interpretation of
monetary policy during this period as having a “stop-go” nature. The story, as revealed in the impulse
responses, might be stated as follows: an exogenous tightening of monetary policy leads to a recession
within six months of the policy action; the reduction in output lasts for at least 18 months. Prices, how-
ever, adjust much more sluggishly to the policy action and the shortfall in output, only beginning to
decline after the funds rate increase has dissipated and the response of output has reached its nadir. The
Fed, when faced with the adverse consequences of the recession, decides (endogenously) after about 18
months to push the funds rate below its initial pre-shock value for some time. This policy reversal helps
pull output back towards its initial level and eventually stabilizes the reduction in the price level as well.
Suchataleisnotinconsistentwithmanyanalysesofpolicymakinginthepre-VolckerFed: thecanon-
ical interpretation within the Taylor rules literature faults the Fed for reacting too weakly to incipient
inﬂation and being too concerned with output.19 What is striking about the sub-sample VAR evidence,
however, is that a very similar pattern is apparent in the post-Volcker sample as well — indeed, both the
magnitudeanddurationofthisapparentreversalinpolicyislargerinthesecondpartofthesamplethan
the ﬁrst. Notice that the response of non-borrowed reserves tells a consistent story: within 18 months
of the initial contractionary shock, the point estimate for non-borrowed reserves turns positive as the
funds rate response becomes negative.
19See,forexample,Taylor(1999)andClaridaetal.(2000)forsupportingargumentsandevidence;Orphanides(2004)provides
an intetesting counter-argument.
10This latter ﬁnding is surprising in light of the Taylor rules literature, and not broadly reported else-
where in the VAR literature. Arguably, the dynamic responses of output and prices differ more substan-
tially between the two sub-samples plotted in ﬁgure 1 (as well as non-borrowed reserves) than do those
for the Fed funds rate. This result raises the question as to whether (and which of) the estimated VAR
equations exhibit statistically discernible differences over time, as well as questions regarding the source
of any instability across sub-samples.
3.1 Quantifying The Effects of Regime Variation
The above statistical evidence reveals instability in several of the equations in the VAR, but does not
convey the economic signiﬁcance of such variation over time. Put succinctly: is there evidence of sizable
differences in the effects of monetary policy over time, and if so, which parts of the empirical model
appear to have contributed the most to any observed changes?
Since individual coefﬁcient estimates in a VAR do not lend themselves to convenient interpretation,
I propose a series of simulations designed to explore the contribution of each structural block of the
VAR to the time variation in the dynamic responses to a monetary policy shock shown in ﬁgure 1. Recall
that, due to the identifying assumptions on the activity sector, Yt, one cannot meaningfully separate
the individual innovations within that block, but all are predetermined with respect to the monetary
policy instrument. To the extent that the identifying assumptions allow treating the equation for the fed
funds rate as a monetary policy rule, and its residuals as the structural monetary policy shocks, I also
investigate the effects of changes to the estimated policy rule. A parallel investigation of changes to the
policy block as a whole returned similar results, and thus are not included here for the sake of brevity.
Atanintuitivelevel,ifreasonablevariationinthegroupofcoefﬁcientsthatcompriseoneofthestruc-
turalblocksoftheVARdoesnotleadtonoticeabledifferencesintheimpliedimpulseresponses,thenone
could conclude that this block does not play a signiﬁcant quantitative role in the determination of the
dynamics. I use the results from the joint and sub-sample estimates above, so that “reasonable” varia-
tionisbasedondataratherthanarbitrarilychosenvalues. Thisapproachhastheadditionaladvantageof
mirroring studies in the Taylor rule literature that focus on the contribution of changes in the estimated
policy reaction function across sub-sample periods.20
At the outset it is important to recognize that the purpose of these simulations is to gauge the contri-
20See, for example, Judd and Rudebusch (1998).
11butionofstructuralchangesindifferentpartsofthemodel: toprovideaquantiﬁablemeasureofpractical
signiﬁcance that complements the statistical tests of section 2.3 above. They are not intended to repre-
sent counterfactual policy experiments. Rather, I want to locate the sources of variation and determine
the sensitivity of the above response functions to changes in the speciﬁcation, in a way that is consistent
with the sample data. Later in this section I compare the modest objectives of this investigation with
related approaches in the literature.
The ﬁrst two simulations investigate the sensitivity of the impulse responses by replacing the esti-
mated structural reaction function from the joint sample with the one from the pre-Volcker (1966:01 –
1979:09) and post-Volcker (1983:01 – 2001:08) sub-samples. These results are shown in the second and
thirdcolumns,respectively,ofﬁgure2;theleft-mostcolumnreproducesthejoint-sampleestimatesfrom
ﬁgure 1. The estimated standard conﬁdence intervals from the joint-sample data also are replicated in
the second and third columns of ﬁgure 2. While there are some differences across the point estimates,
they are not nearly as pronounced as one might expect based upon the incongruent nature of estimated
Taylor rules for these two sub-samples as reported in that literature. Arguably, the endogenous compo-
nent of policy is not a signiﬁcant source of the cross-sample variation as illustrated in ﬁgure 1.21
In a similar vein, ﬁgure 3 shows the effects of varying the speciﬁcation of the activity block by re-
placing the structural estimates from the two sub-samples into the full sample. In this case, the com-
mon estimate of the reaction function over the joint sample is retained.22 As in the experiments above,
relatively little change is found in the dynamics of the funds rate itself. However, the dynamics of the
remaining variables change quite noticeably. The most dramatic is output, which shows a larger initial
decline for the 1966 – 1979 simulation, followed by an increase in the point estimate some 40 quarters
afterthepolicyshock. Forthe1983–2001simulation,thedeclineinoutputismuchsharperandlargerin
magnitude, lying below even the 95% conﬁdence interval on the estimated model. These simulated re-
sults also generate larger price puzzles than in the estimated model. In total, ﬁgure 3 provides evidence
of a economically signiﬁcant change in the underlying structure of the non-policy portion of the U.S.
economy during the sample period in question. These results are not able to identify why the broader
economy may have changed over time. However, it seems unlikely that the change is due to different
monetary policy regimes, given that the results in ﬁgure 2 indicate minimal quantiﬁable consequences
21Nearly identical results are obtained with variation in the monetary block as a whole.
22As noted above, nearly identical results are achieved when the full monetary block is ﬁxed and the sub-sample estimates of
the activity block are used to generate the simulated IRFs.
12of changing the reaction function while those in ﬁgure 3 are derived under the assumption of no shifts
in the speciﬁcation of the reaction function.
3.2 Additional Simulations
The previous results can be interpreted as suggesting that most of the cross-sample variation in the dy-
namics can be attributed to changes in the non-policy sector of the economy. That said, ﬁgure 3 also
can be seen as showing the impact of imposing the same reaction function — one estimated for the
joint sample period — on the two distinct sub-samples. Under this interpretation, the form of the reac-
tion function can be seen to be a much more signiﬁcant source of ﬂuctuations. That is, once the broader
economyisassumedtodifferbetweenthetwosub-sampleperiods, moderatemodiﬁcationstothemon-
etary reaction function may generate substantially different dynamics.
This interpretation suggests an additional set of simulations, in which sub-sample variation of the
broader economy is taken as the starting point — in contrast with much of the Taylor rules literature.23
Inthissetting,replacingtheestimatedpolicyruleforeachdistinctsub-samplewiththeotherconstitutes
an additional measure of the relative importance of variation in the two model components for the dy-
namic responses. Figure 4 examines this experiment for the 1966:01 – 1979:09 estimated model with the
1983:01 – 2001:08 policy rule; ﬁgure 5 shows the converse. In both of these ﬁgures, the left-hand column
reports the actual responses to a 25 basis point contractionary policy shock for the sub-sample listed,
as originally shown in ﬁgure 1. The right-hand column reports the impulse responses when the actual
reaction function is replaced with the one estimated for the other sub-sample. The conﬁdence intervals
from the actual model again are replicated in the right-hand column.
Figure4revealsgreaterinstabilityintheimpulseresponsesofthesimulationsvis-à-visthein-sample
estimated responses. The funds rate response, in particular, appears much more volatile in the pres-
ence of the post-Volcker reaction function. While this difference is not as strong when the full 1983:01 –
2001:08 monetary block is employed (not shown for brevity), the activity variables nonetheless exhibit
greater volatility in response to contractionary policy shocks of identical size. Figure 5 also illustrates
some differences between the actual and simulated results for the 1983:01 –2001:08 sub-sample, but
these are less extreme than those of ﬁgure 4: in general, the counterfactual responses lay inside the con-
ﬁdence intervals of the estimated in-sample responses. (The main exception appears to be the response
23These sub-sample VARs are estimated separately, which also allows for the variance estimates to vary across samples.
13of the funds rate under the alternative reaction function about three years after the initial shock.)
The results in ﬁgure 4 are difﬁcult to reconcile with the conventional wisdom in the Taylor rules lit-
erature that states that the post-Volcker reaction function is stabilizing whereas the pre-Volcker one was
not — if the reaction function is viewed as the key to understanding the changing dynamics of the econ-
omy. While these simple simulations are far from deﬁnitive, they do suggest that the activity block plays
the more important role in determining the dynamic responses to the monetary policy shock. Indeed,
ﬁgure5showsthatreplacingtheactualVolcker-Greenspanreactionfunctionwiththe“sub-optimal”one
from the Martin-Burns-Mitchell era does not appear to signiﬁcantly worsen the nature of the responses
given the activity block for the more recent 1983 – 2001 period. This apparent disparity between the VAR
and the Taylor rules literature deserves further investigation.
3.3 Discussion
As noted in the introduction, VAR analysis has traditionally emphasized the role of the exogenous policy
shocks at the expense of the estimated reaction function. Recent attempts to model the effects of alter-
native monetary policy regimes have generally taken two approaches. The ﬁrst includes counterfactual
simulations such as Bernanke et al. (1997) or Sims (e.g. Sims, 1998a,b; Sims and Zha, 1998), and more re-
cently Hoover and Jordá (2001) and Leeper and Zha (2002). While my approach is similar in spirit (if not
structure)tothosepapers, Idonotclaimtolearnanythingabouttheeffectsofalternativepolicyrulesdi-
rectly: any such assertion would have to address the Lucas Critique, as discussed below. Rather, I merely
am interested in determining how sensitive the estimated dynamics are to reasonable (i.e. data-driven)
variation in the blocks of the identiﬁed VAR.24
A variation on this approach uses Bayesian methods to model stochastic volatility in the coefﬁcients
and/or variances of a VAR model. There are some important differences in the speciﬁc assumptions —
Cogley and Sargent (2001, 2005) and Canova and Gambetti (2005) use time-varying parameter models
while Sims and Zha (2004) employ a regime-switching approach — and identifying assumptions — Cog-
ley and Sargent (2001, 2005) use a small-dimension, recursive reduced-form VAR while Sims and Zha
(2004) and Canova and Gambetti (2005) use structural VAR models — that are used in this literature, and
consensusonthesemodelingchoiceshasnotyetarisen. SimsandZha(2004)alsonotethattheresulting
24Ahmed et al. (2002) and Boivin and Giannoni (2002) undertake similar investigations as I do here, albeit with differences in
the data series and model speciﬁcation.
14posteriordistributionstendtobediffuse. Inmuchofthisresearch,theprimaryfocusismoreonwhether
or not there is evidence of a direct shift (or drift) in policy, and less on the relative contribution of poten-
tial changes in monetary policy to understand sub-sample changes in the transmission mechanism, as
I investigate here (although Canova and Gambetti, 2005, do report support for my main results in their
framework).
A second approach attempts to imbed the question into a more structural framework, then examine
the effects of varying one or more parameters. Recent examples include Boivin and Giannoni (2003),
Favero and Rovelli (2003), and Stock and Watson (2002), amongst others. This approach clearly has
strong appeal, but is not without some difﬁculties.25 Often parameters related to the behavior of pri-
vate agents are held constant while Fed preferences are varied, which presumes the answer to the issues
raised in the introduction.26 A particularly awkward example occurs when one varies the monetary pol-
icy regime while holding ﬁxed the price setting parameter of a Calvo model — itself not a “deep struc-
tural” parameter, but one that likely would vary endogenously with changes in the mean level or persis-
tence of inﬂation. More fundamentally, the solutions to many of these types of models are based upon
a log-linearized approximation around a steady-state inﬂation rate of zero — whereas the data indicate
the steady-state level of inﬂation is neither zero nor constant over the joint sample period studied here.
While I do not wish to minimize the importance of a structural modeling approach for understanding
the role of monetary policy, many of the commonly-used models have a ﬂavor of “incredible restric-
tions” when confronting the data. Thus my motivation in a way is akin to that of the seminal work of
Sims (1980): impose a minimal set of restrictions necessary for identiﬁcation and then investigate the
time series properties of the resulting estimates, particularly the impulse response functions.27
An objection to the above exercise is that the estimated policy rules are not truly structural. For the
simplequestionoftracinghowvariationinpartsoftheestimatedmodelequationsimpacttheestimated
dynamics implied by these equations, this criticism is not of primary importance. At the same time, the
arguments above make it clear that the same objection can and should be applied to many of the results
in the Taylor rules literature, as it does not represent a truly structural relationship either. If one does not
adequately model policy rules as depending on the speciﬁcation of the broader economy, any structural
25In addition to the theoretical caveats I outline, Heckman (2000) notes that “[t]he empirical track record of the structural
approach is, at best, mixed. Economic data ...have not yielded many stable structural parameters.” (p. 49)
26Note that this approach must be taken in certain structural models in order to achieve identiﬁcation for estimation.
27An additional advantage of this approach is that it is broadly consistent with multiple model structures and assumptions,
given that macroeconomists still disagree about the “correct” model of the economy — and likely will for some time.
15change in the behavior of private agents would have to be attributed to changes in the preferences of
policy makers. Indeed, any model that relies upon a simple, ﬁxed parametric speciﬁcation of the private
economy while varying the monetary policy regime may be subject to this general argument.
Moreover, the logic of the Lucas Critique should apply with equal force to models with policy makers
who set policy in an optimizing framework: any change in the underlying determinants of private sector
behavior should be incorporated into the rules that describe the actions of the policy makers. This bi-
directionalnatureofstructuralinstabilitychangingthebehaviorofbothpolicymakersandprivateactors
is implicitly ignored in many approaches in the existing literature. The evidence above, while hardly
deﬁnitive, does point towards the importance of incorporating the feedback from the private sector into
a model of central bank behavior. Moreover, a view of changes in the preferences of policy makers as
the primary explanation for the changes in the observed macroeconomic dynamics seems difﬁcult to
reconcile with the results shown above: to a ﬁrst-order approximation, changes in the policy rule should
have had much more noticeable effects on the simulated impulse responses. Perhaps the impact of such
policyrulechangesarereﬂectedprimarilyinthebehavioroftheprivatesector,whichthenpossiblycould
accountforsomeoftheimportanceofvariationintheactivityblocknotedabove. Butthisexplanationat
best implies that one cannot identify the source of changes in the activity block — they might ﬂow from
changes in the behavior of policy makers, or they might originate elsewhere — and therefore nothing
deﬁnitive can be said about the contribution of changes in policy to the overall stability of the economy.
On the other hand, the Lucas Critique only says that optimizing private agents should respond to
changes in the policy environment — it does not say how large those responses will be in the data. It
is possible that the optimal response to the empirical policy variation identiﬁed here is not especially
large: recently Rudebusch (2003) has illustrated that autoregressive equations for the activity variables
largely are insensitive to historically estimated variation in the policy rule. Alternatively, the empirical
variation in the policy rule itself may not be so sizable — witness the similarities in the response of the
Fed funds rate to a monetary policy shock between the two sub-samples shown in ﬁgure 1 — and that
could justify minimal if any change in behavior by private agents, especially in the face of uncertainty
about the true objectives of policy makers. In other words, the behavior of the private sector might be
robust to certain types and magnitudes of changes in the policy rule.28 Notice that in each of these cases
28One also could conceive of “modest” variation in the policy rule, which rational agents are unable to detect as distinct
policy regimes, in analogy with the “modest interventions” (i.e. temporary deviations from a given policy rule) of Leeper and
Zha (2003). Other costs of learning about and/or adjusting to policy changes could produce “optimal inertia” in the feedback of
16the above simulations may admit a counterfactual policy interpretation, although the main conclusions
of this paper do not depend in any way on such an interpretation.
4 Conclusion
The two main empirical literatures that attempt to quantify the effects of monetary policy on the U.S.
economy — the Taylor rule approach and the structural VAR approach — have focused on distinct com-
ponentsofmonetarypolicyand, ingeneral, havereachedratherdifferentconclusionsaboutthe“impor-
tance” of monetary policy in the economy. While the Taylor rules literature places primary emphasis on
changes in the policy rule speciﬁcation leading to broader changes in macroeconomic dynamics (as in,
e.g.Taylor,1999, orClaridaetal.,2000), untilrecentlymanypapersintheVARliteraturedidnotevenrec-
ognize a meaningful break in the time series processes of the variables in the model (see, e.g., the Hand-
book chapter of Christiano et al., 1999). This paper steers a path between these two extremes, using the
multivariate framework of a structural VAR to explicitly recognize the possibility of changes in both the
policy rule and the broader economy, while (ideally) minimizing the “incredible” restrictions imposed
upon the data. It also straddles the small-dimension, reduced-form estimates of Cogley and Sargent
(2001, 2005) and the larger, fully-identiﬁed regime-switching model of Sims and Zha (2004). Changes in
the operating procedures of the Federal Reserve during the Volcker disinﬂation are accommodated by
estimation over a joint sample of monthly data from 1966 to 2001 that explicitly excludes October 1979
through December 1982.
Simple statistical tests reveal much instability of the equations in the VAR between the two sub-
sample periods, although the impulse response functions are fairly similar — including, somewhat sur-
prisingly, evidence of “stop-go” monetary policy in both the 1966 – 1979 and 1983 – 2001 sub-samples.
Simulations to ascertain the quantitative signiﬁcance of changes in the coefﬁcient values of the VAR
point towards instability in the activity (i.e. non-policy) block of the model contributing more to insta-
bility in the estimated dynamics of the model as a whole than the estimated policy rule (or monetary
block). These results do not depend upon the simulations having a counterfactual policy interpretation.
These results are novel in that much of the existing empirical literature — and related “structural”
investigations of how changes in the monetary policy regime impact the economy — does not represent
policy into private sector behavior. Discrete changes in policy may translate into gradual changes in behavior that are difﬁcult
to identify in the data.
17a framework in which the questions put forth in the introduction can be adequately addressed. In some
instances, the underlying structure of the broader economy is often treated as ﬁxed; in others the behav-
ior of policy makers is assumed invariant to changes in the structure of the economy. Recent research in
a Bayesian framework also had attempted to address these issues; see Sims and Zha (2004) and Canova
and Gambetti (2005) for examples of similarly motivated research that uses very different estimation
techniques and identifying assumptions, yet whose results broadly complement those reported herein.
While not providing a deﬁnitive answer to these questions of causality and the sources of breaks, the
results reported here do strongly suggest the need to investigate further the nature of non-policy related
structural change in the broader economy, and how such changes have affected (or should affect) the
practice of monetary policy.
The gap between Taylor rule models and structural VAR models is still wide. Reconciling the ap-
proaches — and ultimately the conclusions — of these two literatures would be an important step to-
wards improving our understanding of the role of monetary policy in economic ﬂuctuations. In the
interim, this exploration of the potential sources of variability both policy and the private economy may
suggest important avenues to pursue.
18References
Ahmed, Shagil, Andrew Levin, and Beth Anne Wilson, “Recent U.S. Macroeconomic Stability: Good
Luck, Good Policies, or Good Practices?,” July 2002. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System,
International Finance Discussion Paper # 730.
Barth, Marvin J. and Valerie A. Ramey, “The Cost Channel of Monetary Transmission,” in Ben S.
Bernanke and Kenneth Rogoff, eds., NBER Macroeconomics Annual, MIT Press, 2001, pp. 199–240.
Bernanke, Ben S. and Ilian Mihov, “Measuring Monetary Policy,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1998,
113 (3), 869–902.
, Mark Gertler, and Mark Watson, “Systematic Monetary Policy and the Effects of Oil Price Shocks,”
in William C. Brainard and George L. Perry, eds., Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Vol. 1 1997,
pp. 91–157.
Blanchard, Olivier J. and John Simon, “The Long and Large Decline in U.S. Output Volatility,” in
William C. Brainard and George L. Perry, eds., Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Vol. 1 2001,
pp. 135–174.
Boivin, Jean and Marc Giannoni, “Assessing Changes in the Monetary Transmission Mechanism: A VAR
Approach,” Federal Reserve Bank of New York Economic Policy Review, 2002, May, 97–111.
and Marc P. Giannoni, “Has Monetary Policy Become More Effective?,” November 2003. Columbia
University.
Canova, Fabio and Luca Gambetti, “Structural Changes in the U.S. Economy: Bad Luck or Bad Policy?,”
December 2005. Manuscript.
Christiano, Lawrence J., Martin Eichenbaum, and Charles L. Evans, “The Effects of Monetary Policy
Shocks: Evidence from the Flow of Funds,” Review of Economics and Statistics, 1996, 78 (1), 16–34.
, , and , “Identiﬁcation and The Effects of Monetary Policy Shocks,” in Mario I. Blejer, Zvi Eck-
stein, Zvi Hercowitz, and Leonardo Leiderman, eds., Financial Factors in Economic Stabilization and
Growth, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996, pp. 36–74.
19, , and , “Monetary Policy Shocks: What Have We Learned and to What End?,” in John B. Taylor
and Michael Woodford, eds., Handbook of Macroeconomics, Vol. 1 1999, pp. 91–157.
, , and , “Nominal Rigidities and the Dynamic Effects of a Shock to Monetary Policy,” Journal of
Political Economy, February 2005, 113 (1), 1–45.
Clarida, Richard, Jordi Galí and Mark Gertler, “Monetary Policy Rules and Macroeconomic Stability:
Evidence and Some Theory,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, February 2000, 115 (1), 147–180.




and , “Drifts and Volatilities: Monetary Policies and Outcomes in the Post WWII U.S.,” Review of
Economic Dynamics, April 2005, 8 (2), 262–302.
DeLong, J. Bradford, “America’s Peacetime Inﬂation: The 1970’s,” in Christina D. Romer and David H.
Romer, eds., Reducing Inﬂation: Motivation and Strategy, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997,
pp. 247–276.
Favero, Carlo A. and Riccardo Rovelli, “Macroeconomic Stability and the Preferences of the Fed: A For-
mal Analysis, 1961 – 1998,” Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, August 2003, 35 (4), 545–556.
Hanson, Michael S., “The ‘Price Puzzle’ Reconsidered,” Journal of Monetary Economics, October 2004,
51 (7), 1385–1413.
Heckman, James L., “Causal Parameters and Policy Analysis in Economics: A Twentieth Century Retro-
spective,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, February 2000, 115 (1), 45–97.
Hoover, Kevin D. and Oscar Jordá, “Measuring Systematic Monetary Policy,” Federal Reserve Bank of St.
Louis Review, 2001, July/August, 113–137.
Judd, John P. and Glenn D. Rudebusch, “Taylor’s Rule and the Fed: 1970–1997,” Federal Reserve Bank of
San Francisco Economic Review, 1998, (3), 3–16.
20Keating, John W., “Structural Information in Recursive VAR Orderings,” Journal of Economic Dynamics
and Control, September–October 1996, 20 (9–10), 1557–1580.
Kilian,Lutz, “Small Sample Conﬁdence Intervals for Impulse Response Estimates,” Review of Economics
and Statistics, 1998, 80 (2), 218–230.
, “Finite-Sample Properties of Percentile and Percentile-t Bootstrap Conﬁdence Intervals for Impulse
Responses,” Review of Economics and Statistics, November 1999, 81 (4), 653–660.
Leeper, Eric M. and Tao Zha, “Empirical Analysis of Policy Interventions,” NBER Working Paper # 9063,
July 2002.
and , “Modest Policy Interventions,” Journal of Monetary Economics, November 2003, 50 (8), 1673–
1700.
, Christopher A. Sims, and Tao Zha, “What Does Monetary Policy Do?,” in William C. Brainard and
George L. Perry, eds., Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Vol. 2 The Brookings Institute Washing-
ton, DC 1996, pp. 1–78.
McCallum, Bennett T., “Analysis of the Monetary Transmission Mechanism: Methodological Issues,”
NBER Working Paper # 7395, October 1999.
McConnell, Margaret M. and Gabriel Perez-Quiros, “Output Fluctuations in the United States: What
Has Changed since the Early 1980s?,” American Economic Review, 2000, 90 (5), 1464–1476.
Meulendyke,Ann-Marie,U.S.MonetaryPolicyandFinancialMarkets,FederalReserveBankofNewYork,
1998.
Moreno, Antonio, “Reaching Inﬂation Stability,” Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, August 2004, 36
(4), 801–825.
Orphanides, Athanasios, “Monetary Policy Rules, Macroeconomic Stability, and Inﬂation: A View from
the Trenches,” Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, October 2004, 36 (2), 151–175.
Rudebusch, GlennD., “Do Measures of Monetary Policy in a VAR Make Sense?,” International Economic
Review, November 1998, 39 (4), 907–931.
21, “Assessing the Lucas Critique in Monetary Models,” May 2003. Forthcoming in Journal of Money,
Credit and Banking.
Sims, Christopher A., “Macroeconomics and Reality,” Econometrica, January 1980, 48 (1), 1–48.
, “Interpreting the Macroeconomic Time Series Facts: The Effects of Monetary Policy,” European Eco-
nomic Review, 1992, 36 (5), 975–1000.
, “Comment on Glenn Rudebusch’s ‘Do Measures of Monetary Policy in a VAR Make Sense?’,” Interna-
tional Economic Review, November 1998, 39 (4), 933–941.
, “The Role of Interest Rate Policy in the Generation and Propagation of Business Cycles: What Has
Changed since the ’30s?,” in Jeffrey C. Fuhrer and Scott Schuh, eds., Beyond Shocks: What Causes Busi-
ness Cycles?, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston Conference Proceedings, June 1998, pp. 121–160.
, “Comment on Cogley and Sargent, ‘Evolving Post-World War II U.S. Inﬂation Dynamics’,” in Ben S.
Bernanke and Kenneth Rogoff, eds., NBER Macroeconomics Annual, Vol. 16 MIT Press, November
2001, pp. 373–379.
and Tao Zha, “Does Monetary Policy Generate Recessions?,” Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta Working
Paper, July 1998, 98-12.
and , “Were There Regime Changes in U.S. Monetary Policy?,” June 2004. Federal Reserve Bank of
Atlanta Working Paper 2004-14.
, James H. Stock, and Mark W. Watson, “Inference in Linear Time Series Models with Some Unit
Roots,” Econometrica, 1990, 58 (1), 113–144.
Stock, James H. and Mark W. Watson, “Has the Business Cycle Changed and Why?,” in Mark Gertler and
Kenneth Rogoff, eds., NBER Macroeconomics Annual, Vol. 17 MIT Press, March 2002, pp. 159 –218.
Strongin,Steven, “The Identiﬁcation of Monetary Policy Disturbances: Explaining the Liquidity Puzzle,”
Journal of Monetary Economics, August 1995, 35 (3), 463–497.
Taylor,JohnB.,“DiscretionversusPolicyRulesinPractice,”Carnegie-RochesterConferenceSeriesonPub-
lic Policy, 1993, 39, 195–214.
22,“AHistoricalAnalysisofMonetaryPolicyRules,”inJohnB.Taylor,ed.,MonetaryPolicyRules,Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1999, pp. 319–341.









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































24Table 2: Tests for Instability of Reduced-Form Model
a. Wald Tests of Parameter Stability
Equation 8 lags 12 lags 14 lags
IP 0.1510 0.0133 0.0165
CPI 0.0055 0.0503 0.0034
PCOM 0.2126 0.0113 0.0236
FF 0.0004 0.0011 0.0001
NBR 0.2233 0.0343 0.0119
TR 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Notes: Part (a) reports p-values for the null hypothesis of equal coefﬁcent vectors across the two sub-sample
periods, 1966:01 – 1979:09 and 1983:01 – 2001:08. Test statistic has a χ2 distribution.
b. Goldfeld–Quandt Tests of Homoskedasticity in Innovation Variance
Equation 8 lags 12 lags 14 lags
IP 0.0000 0.0006 0.0009
CPI 0.3652 0.2389 0.4134
PCOM 0.0153 0.0424 0.0137
FF 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
NBR 0.0003 0.0034 0.0143
TR 0.8330 0.8249 0.7990
Notes: Part (b) reports p-values for the null hypothesis of equal residual variances across the two sub-sample






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































With 1983−2001 Reaction Function







































































Figure 4: 1966-1979 Impulse Response Comparison:
Actual vs. simulated responses to a contractionary 25-basis point shock

















With 1966−1979 Reaction Function







































































Figure 5: 1983-1997 Impulse Response Comparison:
Actual vs. simulated responses to a contractionary 25-basis point shock
30